PKI · HSM & key management · Post-quantum readiness
Independent cryptographic architecture for systems that must keep working.
A UK-based consultancy working with enterprises and systems integrators internationally. We design and modernise PKI, HSM key management and post-quantum migration plans, starting with how your trust anchors, keys and dependencies fit together.
Where to start
What do you need to change?
Three principal services. Each one starts from a concrete problem and ends with a deliverable you can act on.
Modernise our PKI
The problem
Legacy CA hierarchies and AD CS dependencies that make every change risky.
What you get
A target PKI architecture and a staged migration path.
PKI architecture → 02Strengthen key custody and HSM infrastructure
The problem
Keys spread across ageing HSMs, cloud KMS and applications, with unclear ownership.
What you get
A custody model and a vendor-neutral HSM selection or migration plan.
HSM services → 03Plan post-quantum migration
The problem
No clear view of where quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography sits or what depends on it.
What you get
A prioritised initial migration plan aligned with the NCSC milestones.
Post-quantum transition →Not sure where to start?
Start with an evidence-led assessment, then sequence the remediation.
Cryptographic audits →Our approach
Architecture before algorithms
Algorithm choices are made once the architecture is understood. We start with what each service depends on, so every change can be sequenced, tested and rolled back.
Supporting evidence
SafeCipher CBOM
A cryptographic bill of materials gives discovery an evidence base: certificates, keys, algorithms and protocols within an agreed scope. It informs the architecture and migration plan; it does not replace them.
What we assess
Architectural challenges we assess
The questions an architecture assessment is designed to answer.
PKI and trust architecture
Can the CA hierarchy, its policies and certificate lifecycle support the change you are planning, such as AD CS migration or new trust anchors?
HSM and key custody
Where do keys live, who controls them, and do HSM and KMS arrangements meet custody, resilience and FIPS 140-3 requirements?
Discovery and migration planning
Which systems depend on quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography, and in what order can they change safely?
Verified credentials
Stephen Monti — Director
Companies House records SafeCipher Limited as incorporated on 14 February 2012. The PKI Consortium lists SafeCipher as a member since April 2024 and Stephen Monti in its Cryptographic Module Working Group. Stephen is the author of The Cryptographic Void.
About SafeCipher →Discuss a PKI, HSM or post-quantum architecture challenge.
UK-based, working with enterprises and integrators internationally.
