NCSC post-quantum migration: preparing for the 2028 milestone

The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) sets 2028 as the first milestone in its post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration timeline: define your migration goals, carry out a full discovery exercise, and build an initial plan for migration. For large organisations and operators of complex or bespoke systems, this means understanding which services depend on cryptography, where quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are used, and which suppliers, hardware and long-lived data will shape the migration.

SafeCipher helps technical decision-makers and risk owners turn that milestone into an evidence-led programme. We combine cryptographic discovery with service ownership, data lifetime, PKI, HSM, cloud, IoT and OT dependencies to build a prioritised initial plan. The aim is not an immediate wholesale algorithm replacement, but a controlled route to migration that identifies early priorities, supplier dependencies, testing and rollback requirements.

The NCSC timeline is UK guidance. The discovery and dependency work behind it is relevant to international organisations, which should also map the standards and obligations that apply in each jurisdiction.

The NCSC milestones

  • By 2028: define your migration goals, carry out a full discovery exercise, and build an initial plan for migration.
  • By 2031: carry out your early, highest-priority PQC migration activities, and refine your plan into a thorough roadmap for completing migration.
  • By 2035: complete migration to PQC of all your systems, services and products.

The NCSC notes that there will be a small set of more rarely used technologies for which migration by 2035 may be more difficult, but that all organisations should work towards these dates. Source: NCSC, Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (published 20 March 2025).

NCSC summary of key points

  • Most public-key cryptography in use today will be vulnerable to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer; the best mitigation is PQC.
  • Symmetric cryptography is not significantly affected: existing symmetric algorithms with appropriate key sizes can continue to be used.
  • PQC upgrades can be planned within usual technology refresh cycles.
  • ML-KEM and ML-DSA are suitable for general-purpose use; the NCSC recommends ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 as providing appropriate levels of security and efficiency for most use cases.
  • Operational systems should only use implementations based on final standards.
  • If a post-quantum/traditional (PQ/T) hybrid scheme is chosen, the NCSC recommends using it as an interim measure that allows a straightforward migration to PQC-only in the future.

Source: NCSC, Next steps in preparing for post-quantum cryptography (version 2.0).

1. Define migration goals and accountable ownership

Establish which business services, data-protection needs and resilience objectives the programme must protect, and name accountable service and risk owners. Scope should cover internal and customer-facing services, products, applications, cloud and managed services, networks, servers, end-user devices, IoT and industrial systems, and deployed field devices. Agree how cryptographic agility and future algorithm or protocol changes will be governed.

2. Discover services, data and cryptographic dependencies

Map key services and applications, the data they hold, how long that data must stay confidential, and how it is protected in transit and at rest. Combine top-down service architecture with bottom-up technical discovery. Record public-key algorithms, certificates, keys, protocols, libraries, PKI trust relationships and HSM/KMS dependencies within the agreed scope. A cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) provides evidence, but it should sit alongside service ownership and dependency mapping rather than replace them.

Explore SafeCipher CBOM for evidence-led cryptographic discovery

3. Prioritise risk and choose a migration approach per system

Prioritise critical services, valuable or long-lived data, long-lived trust anchors and hardware, constrained IoT and OT, and dependencies that need supplier action. For each system, assess whether to migrate in place, re-platform, retire, or run to end of life with documented risk acceptance. Do not assume every system needs the same pattern, or that PQC algorithms are drop-in replacements.

See how a cryptographic audit supports discovery and prioritisation

4. Build the initial migration plan

For each priority system, document the target architecture, algorithm and protocol readiness, supplier dependencies, procurement, interoperability testing, rollout sequencing and rollback. Define where traditional and post-quantum cryptography must coexist, how cryptographic agility will be achieved, and the criteria for ending reliance on traditional algorithms.

Enterprise PKI needs specific planning. The NCSC describes several possible migration models, the simplest being a new parallel enterprise PKI using PQC algorithms alongside the traditional PKI, and notes that some devices may require physical interaction. Treat PKI as a dependency-led workstream rather than an algorithm swap.

Review SafeCipher’s PKI architecture and modernisation service

5. Keep the roadmap aligned to standards and suppliers

NIST published FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) in August 2024; the NCSC also covers LMS and XMSS for more specific uses. Most organisations, and most of their suppliers, should rely on certified implementations rather than produce their own. Parameter and protocol choices still need to fit each system’s data lifetime, assurance and interoperability requirements.

Where a PQ/T hybrid scheme is considered, weigh interoperability, implementation security, complexity, and the NCSC’s point that hybrid may mean completing the migration twice: once to hybrid and again to PQC-only.

International organisations: map local obligations separately

Keep the NCSC milestones visible for UK planning while maintaining a register of requirements for each jurisdiction. In the United States, NIST notes that National Security Memorandum 10 set 2035 as the primary target for federal PQC migration, and that Executive Order 14412 requires federal high-value assets and high-impact systems to migrate by 2030 for key establishment and 2031 for digital signatures. These are US federal requirements, not UK or global deadlines. Source: NIST news release on the PQC transition report (October 2026).

Start your 2028 discovery and initial migration plan

SafeCipher can help establish the evidence, ownership and dependencies needed for an actionable initial plan, covering cryptographic discovery, enterprise PKI and certificate estates, HSM and KMS, cloud, supplier dependencies, IoT and OT, and migration governance.

Discuss your PQC discovery and migration plan · Explore enterprise cryptographic audits