A book by Stephen Monti · SafeCipher Ltd
POST-QUANTUM PKI
An Engineer’s Guide to Microsoft AD CS, ML-DSA and Cryptographic Migration
Post-quantum PKI is not simply an algorithm upgrade. It is an architectural transition affecting certification authorities, trust anchors, cryptographic key custody, certificate issuance and relying-party validation.
- Paperback & Kindle
- 259 pages
- 6 × 9 inches (paperback)
- ISBN 978-1-9195529-2-7 (paperback)
- Published 20 November 2026
- From £19.95
Available now in Paperback and Kindle editions.
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A practical engineering reference
POST-QUANTUM PKI is a practical engineering reference for organisations that operate Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and are planning the introduction of ML-DSA, the module-lattice-based digital signature algorithm standardised by NIST in FIPS 204.
It is concerned with architecture, implementation, validation, migration and governance rather than with the mathematics of post-quantum algorithms. The paperback and Kindle editions are available through Amazon, with local pricing in each marketplace.
Why this book matters
Introducing post-quantum certificate services into an established PKI is rarely a single change. The book treats adoption of ML-DSA in an AD CS estate as the introduction of a second trust hierarchy that operates alongside the existing classical one, and works through what that means in practice:
- new certification authorities and trust anchors that must be designed, protected and distributed without disturbing the services that depend on the current hierarchy;
- CA private keys whose custody, ceremonies and HSM integration have to be defined and evidenced before they are trusted;
- certificate templates, enrolment paths and issuing controls that need to be built for the new hierarchy rather than copied from the old one;
- relying parties, including applications, libraries and devices, whose ability to validate ML-DSA certificates has to be established rather than assumed;
- a long period of coexistence, with governance, migration sequencing and evidence that a classical service can safely be retired.
Product capabilities and vendor support for post-quantum cryptography change frequently. The book states product positions as at the dated sources it cites, and asks readers to confirm the current position against vendor documentation and to test in a non-production environment before relying on it.
What engineers will learn
The book is organised around the engineering decisions an AD CS team faces when it plans an ML-DSA hierarchy.
Windows Server 2025 and AD CS
What Windows Server 2025 AD CS documents for ML-DSA, what remains unavailable, and what must be demonstrated in a laboratory before production use.
Parallel CA hierarchies
Designing classical and ML-DSA hierarchies side by side: root and issuing CA separation, trust boundaries and certificate policy.
Templates, enrolment and issuance
Certificate templates, signing-only profiles, request mechanisms, automation boundaries and issuing controls.
HSM integration and key custody
Cryptographic providers, HSM integration, CA key ceremonies and the controls that protect signing authority.
Relying-party validation
Path validation, revocation and interoperability: establishing which applications can validate ML-DSA certificates.
Trust-anchor distribution
Introducing and distributing new trust anchors in a controlled way across the estate.
Governance and policy
Certificate policies, cryptographic inventories, responsibility models, separation of duties and change control.
Migration and retirement
Dependency mapping, migration waves, rollback and the conditions required before classical services can be retired.
Testing and readiness evidence
Laboratory validation, application testing and the engineering evidence needed for a production-readiness decision.
Documented, verified or proposed: the book keeps them apart
Every statement in the book is placed in one of six evidence categories, and each chapter ends with a source register and an evidence note. This separates what vendors and standards bodies document from what has been tested and from what is the author’s recommended design.
- Documented capability — stated by an authoritative source, within its stated scope and date.
- Independently verified behaviour — demonstrated in a controlled test with retained evidence.
- Engineering interpretation — professional judgement that needs review in your own environment.
- Illustrative design — example architectures and templates, not evidence that a configuration has been built or tested.
- Planned functionality — announced or on a roadmap, but not yet delivered.
- Unresolved or untested dependency — something a design depends on whose status has not been established.
Who the book is for
Inside the book
Ten chapters in three parts. Each chapter closes with a source register and an evidence note; Chapter 10 ends with five reusable engineering record templates.
Part I
Understanding the Transition
- Chapter 1Scope, Threat Model and Definitions
- Chapter 2Windows Server 2025: Post-Quantum Capabilities and Architectural Limitations
- Chapter 3Designing Parallel PKI Hierarchies: Trust, Policy and Cryptographic Authority
Part II
Engineering the Second Hierarchy
- Chapter 4ML-DSA CA Deployment, HSM Integration and Cryptographic Key Custody
- Chapter 5ML-DSA Certificate Templates, Enrollment and Issuance Controls
- Chapter 6Relying-Party Validation, Interoperability and Application Support
Part III
Migration, Governance and Assurance
- Chapter 7Migration Sequencing, Coexistence and Classical PKI Retirement
- Chapter 8Cryptographic Governance, Certificate Policy and the PKI Operating Model
- Chapter 9Engineering Evidence, Laboratory Validation and Production Readiness
- Chapter 10The Engineering Implementation Roadmap and Field Reference
About Stephen Monti
Stephen Monti is the founder of SafeCipher, an independent cryptography and PKI consultancy specialising in key management, hardware security modules, cryptographic governance and post-quantum readiness, and the author of The Cryptographic Void. He has advised enterprises, critical infrastructure operators and regulated organisations across financial services, government, industrial systems and cloud environments.
His work has consistently focused on restoring cryptographic authority to the organisations that rely on it, resisting vendor-led strategy and ensuring that encryption serves business risk rather than technical fashion. He is known for beginning engagements with comprehensive cryptographic audits and governance review before any tooling decisions are made. That practitioner-first approach underpins this book’s engineering guidance on Microsoft AD CS, ML-DSA and cryptographic migration. He is based in the UK and works internationally with organisations navigating long-term cryptographic risk and post-quantum transition.
Practical expertise
The book draws on the same areas of work SafeCipher supports in practice: enterprise PKI architecture, AD CS migration, HSM integration and key custody, cryptographic governance and post-quantum migration planning.
Discuss your PKI or post-quantum migration architecture with SafeCipher.
Related reading
Microsoft, Windows, Windows Server and Active Directory are trademarks of the Microsoft group of companies. The author is not affiliated with, sponsored by or endorsed by Microsoft Corporation or any other vendor named in the book.
